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Abstract
We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash,
ε-Nash, subgame perfect, ε-subgame perfect) in infinite sequential
games with real-valued payoff functions depending on the class of
payoff functions (continuous, upper semi-continuous, Borel) and
whether the game is zero-sum. Our results hold for games with two
or up to countably many players.
Several of these results are corollaries of stronger results that we
establish about equilibria in infinite sequential games with some
weak conditions on the occurring preference relations. We also
formulate an abstract equilibrium transfer result about games with
compact strategy spaces and open preferences. Finally, we consider
a dynamical improvement rule for infinite sequential games with
continuous payoff functions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors F.4.1 [Mathematical logic]
General Terms Theory
Keywords infinite games, solution concepts, determinacy, Borel
measurability
1. Introduction
The present article continues the research programme to investigate
sequential games in a very general setting, which was initiated by
the first author in [15, 16]. This programme reunites two mostly
separate developments in the study of games. On the one hand,
the first development is the investigation of variations on solution
concepts for games, and of different formalizations of the prefer-
ences of the players, which primarily happened inside game theory
proper. Related to that, game theory has also seen an interest in
relaxing the continuity and convexity assumptions of NASH’s orig-
inal existence theorem [20], both for an example and references to
further work see [21]. So typically, the countably infinite is absent
from game theory: sets are either finite, or in cases such as random-
ized strategies, have the structure of the continuum.
On the other hand, the study of infinite sequential games has a
long history in logic. Many variations on the rules of games have
been studied, albeit mostly restricted to zero-sum games with two
players and two outcomes. Thus, here the continuum is entirely
absent (discounting its internal occurrence in the set of potential
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plays), and the countably infinite is only used for time, not for
e.g. the number of agents or outcomes.
In our work we study infinite sequential games with perfect
information (i.e. generalized Gale-Stewart games [9]) in a setting
as general as possible. We can have any countable number of
players, and we investigate various ways to represent preferences.
Some results do put restrictions on the number of distinguished
outcomes (as being countable), and some require a (generalized)
zero-sum condition. A similar synthesis of the approaches is found
in [7, 10, 26, 31].
A classical result by MARTIN [17] established that such a game
played by two players who only care about whether or not the
play falls into some fixed Borel set is determined, i.e. admits a
winning strategy for one of the players. While determinacy can
be understood as a special case of existence of Nash equilibrium,
Nash equilibrium is often regarded as an unsatisfactory solution
concept for sequential games in game theory. Subgame perfect
equilibria are a more convincing solution concept from a rationality
perspective. This article studies these two concepts, and as optimal
strategies are not always available, we also investigate the existence
of ε-Nash equilibria and ε-subgame perfect equilibria.
The proofs that we provide fall into two broad categories: some
of our results are obtained by lifting Borel determinacy to more
complicated settings, similar to [15, 16] or to a sketched observa-
tion by MERTENS and NEYMAN in [19]; other results are based on
topological arguments to show strong existence results, albeit at the
cost of continuity requirements in the game characterizations. Both
proof techniques provide general results in rather abstract settings.
In this sense, our main results are Theorem 6 on the one hand, and
Theorems 18, 19, 22 (which share parts of their proofs) on the other
hand.
A common theme of the results is that they are transfer prin-
ciples: they tell us how to take a pre-existing result on a more re-
stricted class of games and obtain from it a result for a more gen-
eral class of games. Theorem 6 is then used to transfer the existence
of subgame perfect equilibria from finite sequential games to cer-
tain infinite ones. With Theorems 18, 19, 22, we can in particular
extend Borel determinacy to yield equilibria in multi-player multi-
outcome settings.
In an attempt to make the rather abstract results somewhat more
accessible, we shall consider in addition the corollaries obtained
in the situation where the goals of the players are to maximize
real-valued payoff functions. Distinguishing properties here are
continuity, upper or lower semicontinuity and Borel measurability.
These settings have been studied before [7, 8, 19, 26], and usually
our corollaries improve upon known results by extending them
from the case of finite players to the case of countably many
players. In particular, prior proofs sometimes use induction on the
number of players, and thus do not generalize to the countably
infinite. An overview of past and new results is given in the table
on Page 3.
Since our existence result for Nash equilibria in games with
continuous payoff functions in Corollary 8 does not, prima facie,
come with a means to construct these, we do consider a dynamical
updating procedure in Section 6 which has precisely the Nash
equilibria of such a game as its accumulation points1.
Our results showcase which requirements are actually needed
for which aspects of determinacy, and as such may contribute to
the understanding of strategic behaviour in general.
Additionally, the emergence of quantitative objectives in ad-
dition to qualitative structure in traditional verification/synthesis
games [2], such as mean-payoff parity games [4, 5], provides an
area of applications for abstract theorems about the existence of
equilibria. Existence results in such settings are usually not trivial,
but are proven together with the introduction of the setting – thus
we do not answer open questions, but are hopeful that our results
may be useful in the future.
Having results for countably many players is important for
applications if multi-agent interactions in open systems are studied.
In order to employ an equilibrium existence result for finitely many
players, a bound on the number of agents involved in the interaction
might need to be common knowledge from the beginning on. Our
results on the other hand easily enable a setting where additional
agents may join the interaction later on, and only the number of
agents who have acted in the past is finite.
2. Background
In our most abstract definition, a game is a tuple 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, (≺a
)a∈A〉 consisting of a non-empty set A of agents or players, for
each agent a ∈ A a non-empty set Sa of strategies, and for
each agent a ∈ A a preference relation ≺a ⊆
(∏
a∈A Sa
) ×(∏
a∈A Sa
)
. The generic setting suffices to introduce the notion of
a Nash equilibrium: A strategy profile σ ∈ (∏a∈A Sa) is called
a Nash equilibrium, if for any agent a ∈ A and any strategy
sa ∈ Sa we find ¬ (σ ≺a σa7→sa), where σa7→sa is defined by
σa7→sa(b) = σ(b) for b ∈ A \ {a} and σa7→sa(a) = sa. In words,
no agent prefers over a Nash equilibrium some other situation that
only differs in her choice of strategy.
We will give additional structure to games in two primary ways:
In Section 3 we add topologies to the strategy spaces, and then
impose some topological constraints on both strategy spaces and
preferences. Beyond that, we will consider games where strategy
spaces and preferences are derived objects from more structured
variants of games. One such variant is the infinite sequential game:
Definition 1 (Infinite sequential game, cf. [15, Definition 1.1]). An
infinite sequential game is an object
〈A,C, d,O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 complying with the following.
1. A is a non-empty set (of agents).
2. C is a non-empty set (of choices).
3. d : C∗ → A (assigns a decision maker to each stage of the
game).
4. O is a non-empty set (of possible outcomes of the game).
5. v : Cω → O (uses outcomes to value the infinite sequences of
choices).
6. Each ≺a is a binary relation over O (modelling the preference
of agent a).
The intuition behind the definition is that agents take turns to
make a choice. Whose turn it is depends on the past choices via the
function d. Over time, the agents thus jointly generate some infinite
1 It should be pointed out that this does not yield a constructive proof of the
existence of Nash equilibria, as finding accumulation points of a sequence
is not a computable operation [3]. In fact, the existence of Nash equilibria
generally cannot be proven constructively, cf. also [23].
sequence, which is mapped by v to the outcome of the game. Note
that using a single set of actions C for each step just simplifies the
notation, a generalization to varying action sets is straightforward.
The infinite sequential games are linked to abstract games as
follows: the agents remain the agents and the strategies of agent a
are the functions sa : d−1({a}) → C. We can then safely regard
a strategy profile as a function σ : C∗ → C whose induced play
is defined below, where for an infinite sequence p ∈ Cω we let pn
be its n-th value, and p≤n = p<n+1 ∈ C∗ be its finite prefix of
length n.
Definition 2 (Induced play and outcome, cf. [15, Definition 1.3]).
Let s : C∗ → C be a strategy profile. The play p = pλ(s) ∈ Cω
induced by s starting at λ ∈ C∗ is defined inductively through its
prefixes: pn = λn for n ≤ |λ| and pn := s(p<n) for n > |λ|.
Also, v ◦ pλ(s) is the outcome induced by s starting at λ. The play
(resp. outcome) induced by s is the play (resp. outcome) induced
by s starting at ε.
In the usual way to regard an infinite sequential game as a
special abstract game, an agent prefers a strategy profile σ to σ′, iff
he prefers the outcome induced by σ to the outcome induced by σ′.
And indeed we shall call a strategy profile of an infinite sequential
game a Nash equilibrium, iff it is a Nash equilibrium with these
preferences. In a certain notation overload, we will in particular
use the same symbols for the preferences over strategy profiles and
the preferences over outcomes.
However, there is a certain criticism of this choice as being not
rational: Essentially, the resulting concept of a Nash equilibrium
means that players can use empty threats – declarations they would
play in a certain way from a position onwards, even if that would be
against their own interests once the position is reached, as long as
this threat keeps other players from moving to that position. This
can be fixed by considering subgame perfect equilibria [28]. We
understand these as the Nash equilibria derived from a different
translation of preferences from infinite sequential games to abstract
games. (Similar remarks were made in [12, Lemma 144 in Section
7.2.3, Section 7.3.2].)
Definition 3. Given an infinite sequential game 〈A,C, d,O, v, (≺a
)a∈A〉, let the subgame perfect preferences2 ≺sgpa ⊆ CC
∗ × CC∗
be defined by σ ≺sgpa σ′ iff ∃λ ∈ C∗ such that pλ(σ) ≺a pλ(σ).
The subgame perfect equilibria of 〈A,C, d,O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 are
the Nash equilibria of 〈A, (Cd−1({a}))a∈A, (≺sgpa )a∈A〉.
We consider a further variant, namely the infinite sequential
games with real-valued payoffs, which can (but do not have to) be
understood as a special case of infinite sequential games.
Definition 4. An infinite sequential game with real-valued payoffs
is a tuple 〈A,C, d, (fa)a∈N〉 where A, C, d are as above, and
fa : C
ω → [0, 1] is the payoff function of player a.
Such a game can be identified with the infinite sequential game
〈A,C, d, [0, 1]A, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 where v(p) = ∏a∈A fa(p) and
x ≺a y iff xa < ya.
As with the introduction of subgame perfect equilibria, we can
consider infinite sequential games with real-valued payoffs as infi-
nite sequential games in a different way, which then gives rise to an-
other commonly studied equilibrium concept, namely ε-Nash equi-
libria. Depending on how we then translate from infinite sequential
games to abstract games, we obtain also ε-subgame perfect equilib-
2 Note that the translation of preferences in the following definition does not
preserve acyclicity. Preservation could be ensured, e.g., by giving the nodes
a linear ”priority” order, in a lexicographic fashion. This, however, would
complicate the definition against little benefit for the point that we want to
make.
Overview
Payoff functions Type ε-Nash Nash ε-subgame perfect subgame perfect
continuous finitely many yes yes yes yes
players - - - [8, Corollary 4.2]
continuous countably many yes yes yes yes
players - - - Corollary 8
upper finitely many yes yes yes no
semi-continuous players - Corollary 23 [26, Theorem 2.1] Example 28
upper countably many yes yes ? no
semi-continuous players - Corollary 23 Example 28
lower finitely many yes no yes no
semi-continuous players - Example 11 [7, Theorem 2.3] -
lower countably many yes no no no
semi-continuous players - Example 11 [7, Subsection 4.3] -
Borel zero-sum yes no yes no
- Example 11 Corollary 21 -
Borel finitely many yes no no no
players Corollary 10 Example 11 Example 28 -
Borel countably many yes no no no
players Corollary 10 Example 11 Example 28 -
Note: The table shows for any relevant combination of properties of the payoff functions, type of the game and type of equilibria whether such equilibria exist
always or whether there is a counterexample. The results as listed here pertain to having finitely many choices at each stage of the game. There is no
difference between two player games and games with finitely many players in any situation we investigate. As we consider perfect information games only,
any zero-sum game is understood to be a two player game. The combination of semi-continuity and zero-sum would imply continuity, and is thus left out. For
continuous payoff functions, we already see complete positive results without the zero-sum condition, and thus do not mention it explicitly either. Both
Corollary 10 and Example 11 seem to be folklore results.
ria. Given some ε > 0, we define the relation≺εa⊆ [0, 1]A×[0, 1]A
by x ≺εa y iff ya − xa ≥ ε. Using ≺εa in place of ≺a in Definition
4 then provides the above-mentioned equilibrium notions.
For infinite sequential games with real-valued payoffs, ev-
ery Nash equilibrium (w.r.t. the standard preferences) is an ε-
Nash equilibrium; and every subgame perfect equilibrium is an
ε-subgame perfect equilibrium. For infinite sequential games, every
subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, in particular,
any ε-subgame perfect equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium.
If the preferences of the players satisfy≺a=≺−1b , where x ≺−1
y ⇔ y ≺ x, we speak of an abstract zero-sum game. As we
consider perfect information games only, any abstract zero-sum
game is understood to be a two player game. (In a zero-sum game,
there are only two distinct preferences. In a perfect information
game, we can identify all players with identical preferences, as
there will be no coordination problems.)
We proceed to recall a few more notions that are only tangen-
tially related to the formulation of our results, but that do show up
in the proofs.
Definition 5. A two-player win-loose game is a tuple 〈C,D,W 〉
with D ⊆ C∗ and W ⊆ Cω . It corresponds to the infinite sequen-
tial game 〈{a, b}, C, d, {0, 1}, v, {<,<−1}〉where d is defined via
d−1({a}) = D and v is defined via v−1({1}) = W .
Finally, we will extend the notion of the induced play. Given
some partial function s :⊆ C∗ → C, we define the consistency set
P (s) ⊆ Cω by:
P (s) = {p(σ) | σ : C∗ → C ∧ σ|dom(s) = s}
3. The continuity argument
A strong transfer result can be obtained using topological argu-
ments alone, with the reasoning being particularly well-adapted
to a formulation in synthetic topology (originally [6], [24] for a
short introduction). Consider games in normal form, with poten-
tially countably many agents with strategy spaces S1,S2, . . .. Our
first condition is that each Si be compact (subsequently, by Ty-
chonoff’s Theorem, also Πi∈NSi). This restriction is very common
and usually combined with continuity of the outcome function,
as it avoids pathological games such as pick-the-largest-natural-
number. Our second condition is that each preference relation≺i is
open (as a subset of (Πi∈NSi)× (Πi∈NSi)).3 In the reading of syn-
thetic topology, this means that any agent will be able to eventually
confirm that he prefers a given strategy profile to another, provided
he does indeed do so. We shall call a class of games G satisfying
these conditions (in a uniform way) to be compact-strategies, open-
preferences. Uniformity here means that we assume a topology on
G such that the function mapping a game to the preferences is con-
tinuous itself.
We will write O(X) for the hyperspace of open subsets of
X, and K(X) for the hyperspace of compact sets. By C(X,Y)
we denote the space of continuous functions from X to Y, in
particular C(N,X) we denote the space of sequences in X. For
precise definitions, see [24]. There we also find that the following
operations are continuous:
1. 4 ∃ : O(X×Y)→ O(X), defined
by ∃(U) = {x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ Y (x, y) ∈ U}
2.
⋃
: C(N,O(X))→ O(X)
3. C : O(X)→ K(X), provided thatX is compact.
4. NonEmptyValue : C(X,K(Y))→ O(X) defined by
NonEmptyValue(f) = {x ∈ X | f(x) 6= ∅}.
3 There actually is a third condition, that any strategy space is overt. A space
X is overt, if {∅} ⊆ O(X) is a closed set, i.e. if there is a way to detect
non-emptiness of open subsets. This condition could only ever fail in a
constructive reading, but is always valid for topological spaces in classical
logic. Synthetic topology however would also allow us to read continuous
map to mean computable map, in which case overtness becomes non-trivial.
In this reading, though, we actually obtain an algorithmic result.
4 In general, the continuity of this map would require Y to be overt. As
explained above, in a classical reading, this condition is always satisfied.
Theorem 6. Let G be compact-strategies, open-preferences, and
let G′ ⊆ G be a dense subclass. If every G ∈ G′ has a Nash
equilibrium, then every G ∈ G has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By combining our continuous operations, we may obtain the
set of all games in G with a Nash equilibrium as an open set in the
following way:
NE := NonEmptyValue
G 7→ (⋃
i∈N
∃(≺Gi )
)C ∈ O(G)
Formulating the individual steps in words: With ≺i being open5,
we immediately obtain that the set of all strategy profiles such
that player i has a better response is uniformly open in the game.
Taking the union over all players again yields an open set, which
complement now is the closed set NE(G) of all Nash equilibria of
the respective game G. As this is a subset of the compact space
(Πi∈NSi), we can even treat NE(G) as a compact set uniformly
in G. By the synthetic definition of compactness, we obtain that
{G ∈ G | NE(G) = ∅} ⊆ G is an open set.
Because we have assumed G′ to be dense in G, we see that
if any game in G would fail to have a Nash equilibrium, this
would imply that some game in G′ would fail, too, contrary to the
assumption.
Consider sequential games with continuous payoff-functions
and finite choices sets. We find:
Lemma 7. 1. The subgame-perfect preferences produce a compact-
strategies, open-preference class S.
2. The games with payoffs fully determined after finitely many
moves are a dense subset Sf ⊆ S.
3. All games in Sf have a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. 1. First, note that the mapping (λ, σ) 7→ pλ(σ) is continu-
ous, so for any fixed λ ∈ C∗,
{(σ, σ′) | fa(pλ(σ)) < fa(pλ(σ′))} is an open set. By taking
countable union, we learn that ≺sgpa is open. Compactness and
overtness of the strategy spaces are straight-forward.
2. As the argument in (1) is uniform in the continuous functions
fa, it suffices to argue that the payoff functions f : Cω → [0, 1]
depending only on some finite prefix of the input are dense in
C(Cω, [0, 1]). A countable base for the applicable topology is
found in all
{f | ∀λ ∈ Ck, p ∈ Cω . p≤k = λ⇒ f(p) ∈ (xλ, yλ)}
for
k ∈ N, x(·), y(·) : Ck → Q ∩ [0, 1]
A base element is non-empty, iff ∀λ ∈ Ck xλ < yλ; and
then it will contain the function f0 : Cω → [0, 1] defined via
f0(p) =
1
2
(
xp≤k + yp≤k
)
, which clearly depends only on the
prefix of length k of its argument.
3. As the actions of the players beyond the finite prefix determin-
ing the outputs is irrelevant, and taking into consideration the
definition of the subgame-perfect preferences, the claim is that
any finite game in extensive form has a subgame perfect equi-
librium. This well-known result is easily proven by backwards
induction: Let the players who move last pick an optimal (for
them) choice. Then the players who move second-but-last have
guaranteed outcomes associated with their moves, so they can
optimize, and so on.
5 And Si being overt, see above.
Corollary 8 ((6)). Any sequential game with continuous payoff-
functions and finitely many choices has a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
In a similar fashion we could consider multi-player multi-
outcome Blackwell games [1, 18] with continuous payoff func-
tions (into [0, 1]). Here each vertex of a finitely branching tree is
labeled with a finite game in normal form, together with a bijec-
tion from the children of the vertex to the (pure) strategy profiles
in the finite game. The players choose a randomized strategy in
each finite game, this then induces a probability distribution over
the paths through the tree. As the payoff for a given player is then∫
fidµs1,... , we again see that the continuity argument applies (and
even w.r.t. subgame perfect preferences):
Corollary 9 ((7)). Any multi-player multi-outcome Blackwell
game with continuous payoff functions has a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium.
4. From discrete to real-valued payoffs
A rather simple argument allows us to transfer existence theo-
rems for equilibria in games with finitely many players, from
Borel-measurable valuations over finitely many outcomes to Borel-
measurable real-valued payoff functions, if one is willing to replace
the original notions by their ε-counterparts. If v : S → [0, 1]m is
the Borel-measurable payoff function, then for any k ∈ N we
define v(k) : S → {1, . . . , (k + 1)}m by v−1(k)(i1, . . . , im) :=
v−1
(
[ i1−1
k
, i1
k
)× . . .× [ im−1
k
, im
k
)
)
. Then any v(k) is again a
Borel measurable valuation. Furthermore, we define the prefer-
ences ≺n for the n-th player by (i1, . . . , im) ≺n (j1, . . . , jm)
iff in < jn. Now any Nash equilibrium of the resulting game is
a 1
k
-Nash equilibrium of the original game, and every subgame
perfect equilibrium of the resulting game is a 1
k
-subgame perfect
equilibrium of the original game. Note that the same argument
can be used for games with countably many players and countably
many outcomes, without any restriction on the branching of the
game-tree.
Corollary 10. 8 Sequential games with countably many players
and Borel-measurable payoff functions with upper-bounds admit
ε-Nash equilibria.
Proof. By combining the statement of [15, Theorem 3.2] with the
argument above.
5. Infinite sequential games with infinitely
ascending preferences
As soon as the continuity requirement for the payoff function (or,
more generally, the openness of the preferences) is dropped, Nash
equilibria may fail to exist. We provide a generic folklore coun-
terexample, and will proceed to demonstrate that the underlying
feature is essential for the failure of existence of Nash equilibria.
The counterexample only requires a single player, and its payoff
function is in a sense the least discontinuous payoff function, and
in particular is ∆02-measurable.
Example 11. Let the payoff function P : {0, 1}N → [0, 1] for the
single player be defined by P (1n0p) = n
n+1
for all p ∈ {0, 1}N
6 This extends [8, Corollary 4.2] from finitely many players to countably
many players.
7 This extends [8, Theorem 6.1] from finitely many players to countably
many players.
8 In his survey [19], MERTENS sketches an observation by himself and
NEYMAN that one may use Borel determinacy to directly obtain this result.
and P (1N) = 0. As P does not attain its supremum, the resulting
game cannot have a Nash equilibrium.
a
1
2
a
2
3
a
n
n+1
0
We proceed to show that the presence of a converging sequence
of plays (pn)n∈N such that a player prefers pn+1 to pn, but prefers
any pn to limi→∞ pi, is a crucial feature of the example above
to have no Nash equilibrium. The proof will be an adaption of
the main result of [15] by the first author. Under the additional
assumption of antagonistic preferences in a two-player game, we
can even obtain subgame perfect equilibria.
In this section the preferences of the players are restricted to
strict weak orders, so we recall their definition below.
Definition 12 (Strict weak order). A relation ≺ is called a strict
weak order if it satisfies:
∀x, ¬(x ≺ x)
∀x, y, z, x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z ⇒ x ≺ z
∀x, y, z, ¬(x ≺ y) ∧ ¬(y ≺ z) ⇒ ¬(x ≺ z)
Definition 13 below slightly rephrases Definitions 2.3 and 2.5
from [15]: the guarantee of a player is the smallest set of outcomes
that is upper-closed w.r.t. the strict-weak-order preference of the
player and includes every incomparability classe (of the preference)
that contains any outcome compatible with a given strategy of the
player in the subgame at a given node of a given infinite sequential
game. The best guarantee of a player consists of the intersection of
all her guarantees over the set of strategies.
Definition 13 (Agent (best) guarantee). Let 〈A,C, d,O, v, (≺a
)a∈A〉 be a game where the ≺a are strict weak orders.
∀a ∈ A,∀γ ∈ C∗, ∀s : d−1(a)→ C, ga(γ, s) :=
{o ∈ O | ∃p ∈ P (s|γCω ) ∩ γCω, ¬(o ≺a v(p))}
Ga(γ) :=
⋂
s ga(γ, s)
We write ga(s) and Ga instead of ga(γ, s) and Ga(γ) when γ is
the empty word.
Lemma 2.4. from [15] still holds without major changes in the
proofs, so we do not display it, but note that when speaking about
≺a-terminal intervals (which are upper-closed sets), we now actu-
ally refer to the terminal intervals of the lift of ≺a from outcomes
to the equivalence classes of outcomes induced by the strict weak
order. Also, we collect some more useful facts in Observation 14
below.
Observation 14. Let 〈A,C,O, d, v, (≺a)a∈A〉, let a ∈ A, assume
that ≺a is a strict weak order, and let γ ∈ C∗.
1. d(γ) 6= a ⇒ Ga(γ) = ∪c∈CGa(γ · c)
2. d(γ) = a ⇒ Ga(γ) = ∩c∈CGa(γ · c)
3. d(γ) = a ∧ |C| <∞ ⇒ ∃c ∈ C, Ga(γ) = Ga(γ · c)
Proof. For example, for 2. note that Ga(γ) = ∩sga(γ, s) =
∩c∈C ∩s(γ)=c ga(γ, s) = ∩c∈C ∩s ga(γ · c, s)
= ∩c∈CGa(γ · c).
Lemma 15. Let 〈A,C,O, d, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game where C is
finite, let a ∈ A, and let us assume the following.
1. ≺a is a strict weak order.
2. For every play p ∈ Cω and every sequence of plays (pn)n∈N
converging towards p, if v(pn) ≺a v(pn+1) for all n, then
v(pn) ≺a v(p) for all n.
Then there exists s ∈ Sa such that ga(s) = Ga.
Proof. Let s0 : d−1(a) → C be a strategy of Player a and let us
build inductively a sequence (sn)n∈N of strategies of Player a, as
follows, where case 3. implicitly invokes Observation 14.
• Let sn+1|C<n := sn|C<n .
• For all γ ∈ Cn\d−1(a), let sn+1|γC∗ := sn|γC∗ .
• For all γ ∈ Cn ∩ d−1(a),
1. if ga(γ, sn) ⊆ Ga then let sn+1|γC∗ := sn|γC∗ ,
2. ifGa ( ga(γ, sn) and there exists µ : d−1(a)∩γC∗ → C
such that ga(γ, µ) ⊆ Ga, let sn+1|γC∗ := µ,
3. otherwise9 let sn+1(γ) := c such that Ga(γ · c) = Ga(γ),
and let sn+1|γCC∗ := sn|γCC∗ .
Let s be the limit strategy of the sequence (sn)n∈N and first note
that, using Observation 14, one can prove by induction on γ that
Ga(γ) ⊆ Ga for every γ ∈ C∗ that is compatible with s. Next, let
p ∈ P (s) be a path compatible with s. If p has a prefix γ that fell
into Cases 1. or 2. during the recursive construction above, then
v(p) ∈ Ga, so let us now assume that case 3. applies at every
node p<n ∈ d−1(a). If such nodes are finitely many, let p<n be
the deepest one, so that Ga = Ga(p<n+1) = ga(pn+1, s) holds
for all strategies s, which implies v(p) ∈ Ga. Let us now assume
that such nodes are infinitely many. If Ga(p<n) ( Ga for some
p<n ∈ d−1(a), there exists µ : d−1(a) ∩ p<nC∗ → C such that
Ga(p<n) ⊆ ga(p<n, µ) ( Ga since Ga(p<n) := ⋂s ga(p<n, s)
by definition, which would mean that Case 1. or 2. applies; so
Ga(p<n) = Ga for all p<n ∈ d−1(a), and subsequently for all
n. Also, since the guarantee is never witnessed (through Case 2.)
at any node p<n ∈ d−1(a), for every o /∈ Ga and every n ∈ N
there exists q ∈ Cω such that q<n = p<n and o ≺a v(q) /∈
Ga(p<n) = Ga. Let us assume for a contradiction that v(p) /∈ Ga,
let q0 ∈ Cω be such that v(p) ≺a v(q0) /∈ Ga, and let us define
a sequence (qn)n∈N inductively such that v(qn) ≺a v(qn+1) /∈
Ga and qn<n = p<n for all n. It implies that v(p) ≺a v(p),
contradiction.
Conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma 16 below are the same as in
Lemma 15, Condition 3 is the conclusion of Lemma 15, which
is similar to the conclusion of Lemma 16, after a key quantifier
inversion, though. We do not merge these two lemmas into one,
nonetheless, since no cardinality assumption on C is needed for
Lemma 16.
Lemma 16. Let 〈A,C,O, d, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game, let a ∈ A,
and let us assume the following.
1. ≺a is a strict weak order.
2. For every play p ∈ Cω and every sequence of plays (pn)n∈N
converging towards p, if v(pn) ≺a v(pn+1) for all n, then
v(pn) ≺a v(p) for all n.
3. For all γ ∈ Cω , there exists s such that ga(γ, s) = Ga(γ).
Then there exists s such that ga(γ, s) = Ga(γ) for all γ ∈ Cω .
Proof. We proceed similarly as in the proof of Lemma 15. Let s0
be a strategy of Player a and let us build inductively a sequence
(sn)n∈N of strategies of Player a. The recursive definition below is
9 Note that due to the properties of a strict weak order, the sets of the form
ga(λ, s) and Ga(λ) are linearly ordered by inclusion ⊆. Thus, Ga (
ga(γ, sn) holds in this case, too.
different from the one in the proof of Lemma 15 in three respects:
the three occurrences of Ga in Cases 1. and 2. are replaced with
Ga(γ); Case 3. is deleted since we now know that it never applies;
and two inclusions are replaced with equalities.
• Let sn+1|C<n := sn|C<n
• For all γ ∈ Cn\d−1(a), let sn+1|γC∗ := sn|γC∗ .
• For all γ ∈ Cn ∩ d−1(a),
1. if ga(γ, sn) = Ga(γ) then let sn+1|γC∗ := sn|γC∗ ,
2. if Ga(γ) ( ga(γ, sn), let sn+1|γC∗ := µ where µ :
d−1(a) ∩ γC∗ → C is such that ga(γ, µ) = Ga(γ).
Let s be the limit strategy of the sequence (sn)n∈N and first note
that, using Observation 14, one can prove by induction on γ that
Ga(γ) ⊆ Ga for every γ ∈ C∗ that is compatible with s. Next, let
p ∈ P (s) be a path compatible with s. Due to the uniformity of the
recursive definition, it suffices to show that v(p) ∈ Ga to prove the
full statement.
Let us make a case distinction. If Case 2. applies only finitely
many times in the construction of s, the sequence (sn|{γ∈C∗ | p∈γCω})n∈N
is eventually constant, so p ∈ ga(p<n, sn) = Ga(p<n) ⊆ Ga for
some n. Otherwise, there exists an increasing function ϕ : N→ N
such that Ga(pϕ(n+1)) ( Ga(pϕ(n)). Let us assume for a contra-
diction that v(p) /∈ Ga and define inductively a sequence (qn)n∈N
such that qn<ϕ(n) = p<ϕ(n) and v(q
n) ∈ Ga(pϕ(n))\Ga(pϕ(n+1))
for all n, which implies10 that p ≺a v(qn) ≺a v(qn+1) for
all n, and subsequently that v(p) ≺a v(p), contradiction, so
ga(s) = Ga, and actually ga(γ, s) = Ga(γ) for all γ ∈ C∗,
by uniformity of the recursive definition of s.
Theorems 18 and 19 below both prove the existence of subgame
perfect equilibria for ”abstract-zero-sum” games, either when the
choice set C is finite, or when the outcome set O is finite. Since
their proofs are similar, most is factored out in Lemma 17 below.
Lemma 17. Let 〈{a, b}, C,O, d, v, {≺,≺−1}〉 be a two-player
game. Let Γ ⊆ P(Cω) and assume the following.
1. ≺ is a strict weak order.
2. For every play p ∈ Cω and every sequence of plays (pn)n∈N
converging towards p, if v(pn) ≺ v(pn+1) (resp. v(pn) 
v(pn+1)) for all n, then v(pn) ≺ v(p) (resp. v(pn)  v(p)
for all n.
3. For all γ ∈ Cω , there exists s such that ga(γ, s) = Ga(γ)
(resp. gb(γ, s) = Gb(γ)).
4. For all non-empty closed E ⊆ Cω , there are ≺-extremal
elements in v[E].
5. For every ≺-extremal interval I and γ ∈ C∗, we have(
v−1[I] ∩ γCω) ∈ Γ.
6. The game 〈C,D,W 〉 is determined for all W ∈ Γ, D ⊆ C∗.
Then the game 〈{a, b}, C,O, d, v, {≺,≺−1}〉 has a subgame per-
fect equilibrium.
Proof. By invoking Lemma 16 once for Player a and once for
Player b, let us build a strategy profile s : C∗ → C, such that
gX(γ, sX) = GX(γ) for all γ ∈ C∗ and X ∈ {a, b}. Let γ ∈ C∗
and let us prove that Ga(γ) ∩ Gb(γ) = {min<(Ga(γ))} =
{max<(Gb(γ))}. Consider the game 〈C,D,W 〉 (as in Definition
5) where the winning set is defined byW := {α ∈ γCω | v(α) ∈
Ga(γ)\{min<(Ga(γ))}} and where Player a owns exactly the
nodes in D := (C∗ \ γC∗) ∪ (d−1({a}) ∩ γC∗). By Assump-
tion 5 the set W is in Γ, so by Assumption 6 the game 〈C,D,W 〉
is determined. By definition of the best guarantee, Player a has no
10 Here we are using again the properties of a strict weak order.
winning strategy for this game, so Player b has a winning strat-
egy, which means that Gb(γ) ⊆ {min<(Ga(γ))} ∪ O\Ga(γ).
Since Ga(γ)∩Gb(γ) must be non-empty, otherwise the two guar-
antees are contradictory,Ga(γ)∩Gb(γ) = {min<(Ga(γ))}. This
means that the subprofile of s rooted at γ induces the outcome
min<(Ga(γ)) (which equals max<(Gb(γ)) by symmetry), and it
is optimal for both players.
Theorem 18. Let 〈{a, b}, C,O, d, v, {≺,≺−1}〉 be a two-player
”abstract-zero-sum” game, where C is finite. Let Γ ⊆ P(Cω) and
assume the following.
1. ≺ is a strict weak order.
2. For every play p ∈ Cω and every sequence of plays (pn)n∈N
converging towards p, if v(pn) ≺ v(pn+1) (resp. v(pn) 
v(pn+1)) for all n, then v(pn) ≺ v(p) (resp. v(pn)  v(p)
for all n.
3. For every ≺-extremal interval I and γ ∈ C∗, we have(
v−1[I] ∩ γCω) ∈ Γ.
4. The game 〈C,D,W 〉 is determined for all W ∈ Γ, D ⊆ C∗.
Then the game 〈{a, b}, C,O, d, v, {≺,≺−1}〉 has a subgame per-
fect equilibrium.
Proof. By application of Lemma 17. Condition 3 is proved by
Lemma 15. For Condition 4, let E be a non-empty closed subset
of Cω , and let T be the tree such that [T ] = E. Consider the game
where Player a plays alone on T . Since Player a can maximise
her best guarantee by Lemma 15, and since all her guarantees are
singletons, v[E] has a≺-maximum. Likewise, it has a≺-minimum,
by considering Player b.
Theorem 19. Let 〈{a, b}, C, d,O, v, {<,<−1}〉 be an infinite
sequential game where O is finite and < is a strict linear order.
Let Γ ⊆ P(Cω) and assume the following.
1. ∀O′ ⊆ O, ∀γ ∈ C∗, {α ∈ Cω | v(γα) ∈ O′} ∈ Γ
2. The game 〈C,D,W 〉 is determined for all W ∈ Γ and D ⊆
C∗.
Then the game 〈{a, b}, C, d,O, v, {<,<−1}〉 has a subgame per-
fect equililbrium.
Proof. by Lemma 17 where Conditions 2, 3, and 4 hold by finite-
ness of O.
Corollary 20. Let 〈{a, b}, C, d,O, v, {<,<−1}〉 be an infinite
sequential game where O is finite and < is a strict linear order.
If v−1(o) is quasi-Borel for all o ∈ O, the game has a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Proof. From Theorem 19, quasi-Borel determinacy [18], and Lemma
3.1. in [15].
Corollary 21. A sequential two-player zero-sum game with Borel
measurable payoffs has ε-subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof. By Corollary 20 and the argument in Section 4.
Theorem 22. Let 〈A,C,O, d, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game, Γ ⊆
P(Cω) and assume the following.
1. The ≺a are strict weak orders.
2. C is finite.
3. For every play p ∈ Cω , every sequence of plays (pn)n∈N
converging towards p, and every player a ∈ A, if v(pn) ≺a
v(pn+1) for all n, then v(pn) ≺a v(p) for all n.
4. For every player a ∈ A and≺a-terminal interval I and γ ∈ C∗,
we have
(
v−1[I] ∩ γCω) ∈ Γ.
5. The game 〈C,D,W 〉 is determined for all W ∈ Γ, D ⊆ C∗.
Then the game 〈A,C,O, d, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.9 in [15],
we rephrase and give it a more intuitive flavour. Let σ be a strategy
profile where every player is using a witness to Lemma 16 (which is
applicable by Lemma 15). Let p be the induced play. We now turn
σ into a Nash equilibrium with p as induced play by use of threats.
More specifically, at each node p<n we let the players other than
a := d(p<n) threaten Player a that if she deviates from p exactly
at p<n, they will team up against her at every subsequent position
γ after p<n other than those extending the prescribed p<n+1.
We claim that if they team up, they can prevent Player a from
getting better outcome than v(p) by deviating to γ, which will
suffice. Let us build a win-lose game 〈C,D,W 〉, with Player a
against her threatening opponents gathered as a meta-player, and
where the winning set for Player a is defined by W = v−1[I] ∩
γCω , where I := {o ∈ O | v(p) ≺a o}, and D is defined
by D = d−1({a}) ∪ (C∗ \ γC∗). This game is determined by
Assumptions 4 and 5, and Player a looses it, otherwise her winning
strategy would guarantee that v(p) /∈ Ga(p<n) and thus contradict
the choice of p. Therefore the threat of the opponents of Player a is
effective.
For comparison, the preparatory work before [15, Theorem 2.9]
considers strict well-orders only; then [15, Theorem 2.9] considers
strict well-founded orders, since linear extensions of these make
it possible to invoke the special, linear case, knowing that any
Nash equilibrium for these extensions is still a Nash equilibrium for
the original preferences. However, let us explain why Theorem 22
assumes that preferences are strict weak orders, instead of more
general strict partial orders. In the preparatory work before both
results, the algorithm that builds a play step by step makes decisions
based on the guarantees that the subgames offer. If the guarantees
of one player were not ordered by a strict weak order, the player
might eventually regret a previous decision, in the same way that
backward induction on partially ordered preferences may not yield
a Nash equilibrium (see e.g., [11] for a concrete example or page 3
of [13] for a generic one). So the algorithm has to run on strict weak
orders. (In [15, Theorem 2.9] it even runs on strict linear orders.)
If we wanted to consider strict partial orders and extend them
linearly for the algorithm to work, we would potentially run into
two problems: First, there may not exist any linear extension pre-
serving Condition 3. Second, assumptions 4 and 5 of Theorem 22
make sure that the win-lose games associated with the≺a-terminal
intervals are determined, which is a requirement for the proof to
work. If the preferences were not strict weak orders, we might think
of replacing the condition on terminal intervals by a condition on
the upper-closed sets and then extend the preferences linearly for
the algorithm to work, but in the special case where the preference
of one player were the empty relation, every subset would be an
upper-closed set and its preimage by v would be in the pointclass
with nice closure property, by assumption. If, in addition, each out-
come is mapped to at most one play, it implies that each subset of
Cω is in the pointclass, so Theorem 22 could be used with the ax-
iom of determinacy only, but not with, e.g., Borel determinacy. On
the contrary, [15, Theorem 2.9, Assumption 3] is not an issue since
there are only countably many outcomes in that setting.
Theorem 22 has a corollary pertaining to sequential games with
real-valued payoffs. Rather than the usual Euclidean topology, we
consider the lower topology generated by {(−∞, a) | a ∈ Q}.
This space will be denoted by R>. Note that continuous functions
with codomain R> are often called upper semi-continuous. As
id : R> → R is complete for the Σ02-measurable functions [30, 32],
we see that the Borel sets11 on R> are the same as the Borel sets
on R. Moreover, if (pn)n∈N is a converging sequence of plays,
and P : {0, 1}N → R> is a continuous payoff function, then
P (limi∈N pi) ≥ lim supi∈N P (pi). In particular, Condition 3 in
Theorem 22 is always satisfied for the preferences obtained from
upper semi-continuous payoff functions.
Corollary 23. Sequential games with countably many players,
finitely many choices and upper semi-continuous payoff functions
have Nash equilibria.
6. Lazy improvement
The lazy improvement was introduced in [14] for finite sequential
games. Intuitively, it consists in repeating the game and letting,
at each repetition, an arbitrary player improve upon the current
outcome by first identifying a reachable and improving leaf of the
game tree, and second by changing her strategy only as much as
necessary to reach this leaf. In particular a player never changes
her choices that are rendered irrelevant by prior choices of other
players. For instance below, consider the four strategy profiles on
the same game with players a and b, where strategical choices are
represented by double lines and where only the payoff of Player a
is displayed at the two relevant leaves. The top-left profile can be
lazily improved into the top-right one, but not into the bottom-left
or bottom-right ones.
a
b
a
0
b
a
a
1
a
a
b
a
0
b
a
a
1
a
a
b
a
0
b
a
a
1
a
a
b
a
0
b
a
a
1
a
For finite sequential games, lazy improvement terminates quickly
and settles at Nash equilibria, as proved in [14]. The idea of lazy
improvement can be extended to infinite sequential games with
continuous payoff functions. Since we consider continuous pay-
off functions, for each improvement step there is a similar im-
provement step with finitely many node changes, so we rule out
improvement steps with changes at infinitely many nodes. In the
infinite case, the dynamics are somewhat less well-behaved than
one could wish for; but still provide a characterization of Nash
equilibria as the accumulation points of certain sequences.
As a slight oddity, we find that the lazy improvement dynamics
are not fully determined by the game, but there is a degree of
consistent choice needed to ensure the intended behaviour. We can
use the continuous payoff function to label any game vertex with
some rational interval in a way12 that the label of any vertex is
a subset of its predecessor, and that the intersection of all labels
along an infinite path is the singleton set containing the payoff for
this path. Now lazy improvement decisions are made based only by
11 AsR> is not metric (but still countably based), the definition of the Borel
hierarchy has to be modified as demonstrated by SELIVANOV [27]. A move
towards definitions of Borel measurability on even more general spaces can
be found in [25].
12 The idea behind this corresponds to the representation of real numbers in
computable analysis [32].
inspecting the strategy profile and game tree (including labels) up
to some finite depth d, using the definitions from [14].
Once all players are stable at the current inspection depth, the
inspection depth is incremented by one. The incrementing shall be
counted as an updating step, thus always some infinite sequence of
strategy profile arises. We shall call the subsequence correspond-
ing to steps where the inspection depth is incremented the stable
subsequence.
Note that the choice of labeling system is not uniquely deter-
mined by the payoff function, and that the labeling in turn influ-
ences the lazy improvement dynamics. Moreover, note that while
we are dealing with linear preferences only in the case of infinite
games, we do make use of finite approximations that lack linear
preferences – yet we are guaranteed that any preferences occurring
in our finite approximations are acyclic, which is sufficient for [14].
Finally, as the investigation depth is never reset, the dynamics do
depend on the history – however, only on its length, not on any
details.
Observation 24. The lazy improvement dynamics are computable,
i.e. given a game and an initial strategy profile, we can compute
a sequence of strategy profiles arising from lazy improvement, as
well as the indices of the stable subsequence.
Theorem 25. The following properties are equivalent for a strategy
profile s:
1. s is a Nash equilibrium.
2. s is a fixed point13 for lazy improvement.
3. s is an accumulation point of the stable subsequence of a se-
quence obtained from iterated lazy improvement.
Proof. 1.⇔ 2. By continuity of the preferences, a player prefers a
strategy profile s to another profile s′, if and only if there is an
inspection depth d such that he prefers the restriction of s to the
restriction of s′ in the corresponding finite approximation. This
in turn implies that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of
the infinite game, if and only if all its finite prefixes are Nash
equilibria in the corresponding finite games. The same holds for
fixed points by construction of the lazy improvement steps for
infinite games. Thus, the claim for infinite games follows from
the result for finite games, i.e. [14, Proposition 10].
2.⇒ 3. If s is a fixed point, then the lazy improvement sequence
with starting point s is constant, hence has s as accumulation
point.
3.⇒ 2. Let the strategy profile s arise as an accumulation point
of the stable subsequence of a sequence (sn)n∈N obtained by
iterated lazy improvement, and assume that s is not a fixed
point. Then there is some minimal inspection depth d necessary
to find a lazy improvement step in s, which is executed by some
player p. The detection at inspection depth d means that any
strategy profile s′ sharing a finite prefix of depth d with s will
admit exactly the same lazy improvement step.
The assumption that s is an accumulation point of the stable
subsequence in particular implies that infinitely many strategy
profiles occur that share a prefix of length dwith s. In particular,
there would have to be a strategy profile that shares a prefix of
length d with s, and that is stable at inspection depth d′ > d.
But, as explained above, player pwould then wish to change his
strategy, i.e. we have arrived at a contradiction. Hence, s has to
be a fixed point.
13 Given the history dependence of the lazy improvement dynamics, a fixed
point is understood to be any starting point of a lazy improvement sequence
resulting in a constant sequence, i.e. no improvement step is found at any
inspection depth.
Next, we shall provide an example exhibiting the necessity of
the various restrictions of the preceding theorem.
Example 26. Let us consider games with four players a, b, c, and
d. Given four real-valued sequencesA = (αn)n∈N, B = (βn)n∈N,
C = (γn)n∈N, and D = (δn)n∈N converging towards α, β, γ, and
δ, let T (A,B, C,D) be the following game and strategy profile.
Note that apart from the payoffs, the underlying game effectively
involves Players c and d only. If C and D are decreasing, the lazy
improvement dynamics see players c and d alternating in switching
their top left-move to a right-move.
c
α0, β0, γ0, δ0 d
α1, β1, γ1, δ1 c
αn, βn, γn, δn
α, β, γ, δ
Let A := B := (1 + 1
n+1
)n∈N and let C := D := (1 −
1
n+1
)n∈N. Starting from the profile below, players c and d will
continue to unravel the subgame currently chosen jointly by a
and b. Player b will keep alternating her choices to pick the least-
unraveled subgame available to her. Player a will prefer to chose
a subgame where player b currently chooses right, and also prefers
less-unraveled subgames.
a
b
T (A,B, C,D) T (1 +A,B, C,D)
b
T (A,B, C,D) T (1 +A,B, C,D)
First of all, already the subgame where b moves first demon-
strates that the lazy improvement dynamics will not always con-
verge, hence we have to consider accumulation points rather than
limit points. For the next feature, note that there is an infinite se-
quence of lazy improvement where Players a and b (at both node
that she owns) switch infinitely often, and where Player a switches
only when Player b chooses the right subgame (on the induced
play). Then the following strategy profile is an accumulation point
(however, not an accumulation point of the stable subsequence). It
is clearly not a Nash equilibrium, thus justifying the restriction to
accumulation points of the stable subsequence in Theorem 25.
a
b
1, 1, 1, 1 2, 1, 1, 1
b
1, 1, 1, 1 2, 1, 1, 1
7. Absence of subgame perfect equilibria
In this section we will show that in the simultaneous absence
of continuity and the zero-sum property, even a two-player game
with three distinct outcomes may fail to have subgame perfect
equilibria. It is a straightforward consequence that moving to ε-
subgame perfect equilibria cannot help, either. As our (counter-)
Example 11, the valuation function here is ∆02-measurable, hence,
in a sense, not very discontinuous. A similar counterexample is also
exhibited in [29, Example 3].
Example 27. The following game where z <a y <a x and
x <b z <b y has no subgame perfect equilibrium.
ab
a
b
a
x
y
z
y
z
y
The game above is formally defined as 〈{a, b}, {0, 1}, d, O, v, {<a
, <b}〉, where d−1(a) := 02∗ and v(0ω) := x and v[02∗1{0, 1}ω] :=
{y} and v[02∗+11{0, 1}ω] := {z}.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there is a subgame perfect
equilibrium for this game. Then no subprofile (starting at some
node in 0∗) induces the outcome x, because Player b could then
switch to the right and obtain z. So for infinitely many nodes in
0∗, Players a or b chooses 1. Also, if Player b chooses 1 at some
node 02n+1, Player a chooses 1 at the node 02n right above it. This
implies that every subprofile rooted at nodes in 02∗ induces the
outcome y, and subsequently, Player b always chooses 0 at nodes
in 02∗+1. But then Player a could always choose 0 and obtain x,
contradiction.
A further example shows us that we can rule out subgame
perfect equilibria even with stronger conditions on the functions
by using countably many distinct payoffs. This example no longer
extends to ε-subgame perfect equilibria.
Example 28. The following game where yn := (2−n, 2−n) and
zn := (0, 2
−n−2) for all n ∈ N has no subgame perfect equilib-
rium, although the payoff functions are upper-semicontinuous.
a
b
a
b
a
(2, 0)
y2
z1
y1
z0
y0
Proof. If the payoffs are (2, 0), Player b can improve her payoff
as late as required, so there are infinitely many ”right” choices in
a subgame perfect equilibrium. If the payoffs are not (2, 0) then
Player a chooses ”right” at every node that she owns, so that Player
b chooses ”left”, but then Player a chooses ”left” too.
8. Outlook
There is one open question regarding infinite sequential games
with real-valued payoff functions (see the question mark in the
Overview table on page 3), namely:
Open Question 29. Do games with countably many players and
upper-semicontinuous payoff functions have ε-subgame perfect
equilibria?
It seems surprising to have both Nash equilibria and ε-subgame
perfect equilibria, but no subgame perfect equilibria – but this is
precisely the situation for finitely many players. On the other hand,
given the split between finitely many players and countably many
players for lower-semicontinuous payoff functions, one should be
cautious about assuming that this result would extend. Thus, we do
not present a conjecture regarding the answer to the open question.
A more abstract question is whether there is a connection be-
tween existence results for infinite games and complexity / decid-
ability results for finite games with related winning conditions14. In
an intermediate step, one could investigate the connections to fini-
tary infinite15 games such as generalized Muller games studied in
[22].
Finally, the condition on the payoff functions used in Section 5
seems to merit further investigation. This was that for any sequence
(pi)i∈N converging to p in Cω , we find that ∀i ∈ N v(pi) ≺
v(pi+1) implies ∀i ∈ N v(pi) ≺ v(p). This is a weaker condition
than continuity of the function where the upper order topology is
used on the codomain, which still seems to be strong enough to
formulate some results. In a sense, it is a weakening of continuity
that is orthogonal to Borel-measurability.
References
[1] D. Blackwell. Infinite Gδ games with imperfect information. Zas-
towania Matematyki Applicationes Mathematicae, 1969.
[2] R. Bloem, K. Chatterjee, T. A. Henzinger, and B. Jobstmann. Better
quality in synthesis through quantitative objectives. In A. Bouajjani
and O. Maler, editors, Computer Aided Verification, volume 5643 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 140–156. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2009. .
[3] V. Brattka, G. Gherardi, and A. Marcone. The Bolzano-Weierstrass
Theorem is the jump of Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma. Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic, 163(6):623–625, 2012. . also arXiv:1101.0792.
[4] K. Chatterjee and L. Doyen. Energy parity games. Theor. Comput.
Sci., 458:49–60, 2012. .
[5] K. Chatterjee, T. A. Henzinger, and M. Jurdzin´ski. Mean-payoff parity
games. In Proceedings, Twentieth Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic
in Computer Science, LICS 2005, pages 178–187. IEEE Computer
Society Press, 2005.
[6] M. Escardo´. Synthetic topology of datatypes and classical spaces.
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 87, 2004.
[7] J. Flesch, J. Kuipers, A. Mashiah-Yaakovi, G. Schoenmakers,
E. Solan, and K. Vrieze. Perfect-information games with lower-
semicontinuous payoffs. Mathematics of Operations Research, 35(4):
742–755, 2010.
[8] D. Fudenberg and D. Levine. Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and
infinite-horizon games. Journal of Economic Theory, 31(2):251 – 268,
1983. .
[9] D. Gale and F. Stewart. Infinite games with perfect information.
In Contributions to the theory of games, volume 28 of Annals of
Mathematical Studies, pages 245–266. Princeton University Press,
1953.
[10] E. Gra¨del and M. Ummels. Solution concepts and algorithms for
infinite multiplayer game. In K. Apt and R. van Rooij, editors, New
Perspectives on Games and Interaction, volume 4 of Texts in Logic
and Games, pages 151–178. Amsterdam University Press, 2008.
[11] T. Krieger. On Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form
games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 58:449–458,
2003.
14 This question was raised by one of the referees.
15 The game duration is infinite, but the game is described in a finite way.
[12] S. Le Roux. Generalisation and formalisation in game theory. Ph.D.
thesis, Ecole Normale Supe´rieure de Lyon, January 2008.
[13] S. Le Roux. Acyclic preferences and existence of sequential Nash
equilibria: a formal and constructive equivalence. In TPHOLs, In-
ternational Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 293–309. Springer, August
2009.
[14] S. Le Roux. Lazy beats crazy: a spurious yet mathematical justification
for laissez-faire. arXiv:1309.2798, 2013.
[15] S. Le Roux. Infinite sequential Nash equilibria. Logical Methods in
Computer Science, 9(2), 2013.
[16] S. Le Roux. From winning strategy to Nash equilibrium. Mathemati-
cal Logic Quarterly, 2014. (to appear, cf. arXiv 1203.1866).
[17] D. A. Martin. Borel determinacy. Annals of Mathematics, 102(2):pp.
363–371, 1975. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1971035.
[18] D. A. Martin. The determinacy of blackwell games. Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 63(4):1565–1581, 1998. .
[19] J. F. Mertens. Repeated games. In Proc. Internat. Congress Mathe-
maticians, pages 1528–1577. American Mathematical Society, 1987.
[20] J. F. Nash. Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1):48–49, 1950. URL
http://www.pnas.org/content/36/1/48.short.
[21] R. Nessah and K. Kerstens. Characterizations of the existence
of Nash equilibria with non-convex strategy sets. Working Pa-
pers 2008-ECO-13, IESEG School of Management, 2008. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ies/wpaper/e200813.html.
[22] S. Paul and S. Simon. Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller
Games. In R. Kannan and K. N. Kumar, editors, IARCS Annual
Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoreti-
cal Computer Science, volume 4 of Leibniz International Proceed-
ings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 335–346, Dagstuhl, Germany,
2009. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik. . URL
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2330.
[23] A. Pauly. How incomputable is finding Nash equilibria? Journal of
Universal Computer Science, 16(18):2686–2710, 2010. .
[24] A. Pauly. A new introduction to the theory of represented spaces.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.3763, 2012.
[25] A. Pauly and M. de Brecht. Towards synthetic descrip-
tive set theory: An instantiation with represented spaces.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1307.1850, 2013.
[26] R. Purves and W. Sudderth. Perfect information games with upper
semicontinuous payoffs. Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(3):
468–473, 2011.
[27] V. L. Selivanov. Difference hierarchy in ϕ-spaces. Algebra and Logic,
43(4):238–248, 2004.
[28] R. Selten. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit
Nachfragetra¨gheit. Z. Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 12:301–324, 1965.
[29] E. Solan and N. Vieille. Deterministic multi-player dynkin games.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 39(8):911 – 929, 2003. .
[30] T. v. Stein. Vergleich nicht konstruktiv lo¨sbarer probleme in der
analysis. Master’s thesis, Fachbereich Informatik, FernUniversita¨t
Hagen, 1989.
[31] M. Ummels. Rational behaviour and strategy construction in infinite
multiplayer games. Diploma thesis, RWTH Aachen, 2005.
[32] K. Weihrauch. Computable Analysis. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to Vassilios Gregoriades and the anonymous
referees for their helpful comments. This work benefited from the
Royal Society International Exchange Grant IE111233. The au-
thors participate in Marie Curie International Research Staff Ex-
change Scheme Computable Analysis, PIRSES-GA-2011- 294962.
